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SUMMER 1970]
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE RIGHT
TO TREATMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically the development of community attitudes towards mental
illness was determined by the belief that this condition was due to the will
of God and was therefore, incurable.' This attitude was reflected in the
early colonial period when the primary concern was custodial confinement
of the insane with no attempt at care or treatment.2 In Pennsylvania, the
legislature authorized the establishment of a mental hospital in 17513 but
it was not until 1869 that any detailed rules for civil commitment were
enacted.4 Even under these new rules, however, custody was emphasized
since the rules required only "the certification of two or more reputable
physicians" 5 for hospitalization with no mention of care or treatment. With
the exception of a few minor amendments, Pennsylvania retained this
statute until the passage of the Mental Health Act of 19516 which col-
lected and codified existing law. Although there was some mention of
treatment in the 1951 Act, its main thrust was still the exercise of custody
of the mentally ill for protection of the community. 7
The growing awareness of the plight of the insane and the develop-
ment of new concepts in the mental health field emphasized the glaring
inadequacy of this statutory scheme. Recognizing this deficiency, the
General Assembly promulgated the "Mental Health and Mental Retarda-
tion Act of 1966" which was intended to redress the previous statute's
failure to acknowledge psychiatric advancements. Although the 1966 Act
is couched in therapeutic terms and justifies commitment only when a
person is mentally ill and "in need of care," the custodial rather than the
therapeutic aspects of civil commitment are still predominant in Pennsyl-
1. J. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 141 (1968).
2. Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirement of "Due
Process," 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28 (1960).
3. For an excellent analysis of the historical developments of mental health
legislation in the United States, see A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA
(2d ed. 1949).
4. Pa. Laws 1869, No. 78.
5. Pa. Laws 1869, No. 78, § 1. The procedure outlined by this statute has
remained significantly unchanged over the century which elapsed since its enactment.
6. No. 141, [1951] Laws of Pa. 533 (repealed 1966).
7. An empirical analysis of the lack of treatment under this Act may be foundin Note, Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania and New Jersey,
110 U. PA. L. REv. 78 (1961).
8. PA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704 (1969). For an excellent comparative
analysis of the new Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 with the
Mental Health Act of 1951, see Comment, Hospitalization of the Mentally Disabledin Pennsylvania: The Mental Health - Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 71 DICK.
L. REV. 300 (1967). See also Comment, Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Ill in Pennsylvania, 5 DuQ. L. REV. 487 (1967) ; Comment, Release Procedure Under
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vania in the absence of a statutory right to treatment.9 The purpose of
this Comment is to explore the development of a right to treatment and
analyze the effect that its recognition would have on Pennsylvania law
and practice in the field of mental health. This Comment will be divided
into three sections: (1) the present statutory and case law in Pennsylvania
and its performance in terms of available facilities and resources; (2) the
theoretical and practical basis for a right to treatment; and (3) the pro-
posed Pennsylvania statute dealing with a right to treatment.
II. INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. Present Pennsylvania Law
The primary legal justification for involuntary civil commitments'0 in
Pennsylvania, as in many other states, is the doctrine of parens patriae."1
This doctrine refers "to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons
under disability . . . such as . . . insane and incompetent persons. ... 12
The underlying rationale for parens patriae is that these people are unable
to care for themselves and the state has a "right, if not [a] duty, to care
for those persons .... '113 The necessary inference to be drawn from this
rationale is that since the prospective patient is "in need of care," hospitali-
zation will be beneficial and, therefore, confinement is justified. 14 Although
this may be an accurate representation in some cases, it will be seen later
that hospitalization is frequently not beneficial and that to some individuals
it may actually be detrimental.' 5
9. The phrase "right to treatment" has acquired a number of meanings depending
in part upon whether it is viewed as a constitutional, statutory or administrative right.
Since these differences will be discussed fully in Part II of this Comment, it will
suffice at this time to define right to treatment as the duty of the state to provide the
treatment upon which it justified involuntary hospitalization of the individual. See
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHl. L. REv. 742, 748 (1969).
10. This Comment will deal only with those three sections [PA. STAT. tit.
50, §§ 4404-406 (1969)] which are directed at compulsory hospitalization of object-
ing non-criminals. No attempt will be made to view the rights of voluntary patients
[PA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 4402-403 (1969)] or those of persons either charged with or
found guilty of a crime [PA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 4407-417 (1969)]. Many aspects of
the latter, however, are discussed elsewhere. See Comment, Commitment to Fair-
view: Incompetency to Stand Trial in Pennsylvania, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1164 (1969) ;
see also Comment, Equal Protection and Prison-To-Hospital Transfers: United
States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 410 (1970).
11. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grove v. Jackson, 16 F. Supp. 126 (M.D. Pa.
1936) (the state is parens patriae of the insane); Commonwealth ex rel. Tate v.
Shovlin, 205 Pa. Super. 370, 208 A.2d 924 (1965) (the court is parens patriae for the
insane petitioner).
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th ed. 1951).
13. Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally
Ill, 1969 DUKE L. REV. 677, 683.
14. But see Kaplan, Civil Commitment "As You Like It," 49 B.U.L. REv. 14(1969), where the author states that the threat of a "therapeutic state" is upon us
due to the vague notions of parens patriae used to deprive a person of his liberty,
"for his own good," against his will.
Some authors have also viewed non-judicial commitments on the basis of
parens patriae as being on highly questionable constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Tao,
Some Problems Relating to Compulsory Hospitaliaation of the Mentally Ill, 44 J.
URBAN LAW 459 (1967) ; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and
Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (1966).
15. See note 93 infra and accompanying text. 2
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Parens patriae in Pennsylvania is incorporated into the Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 through the phrase "mentally disabled
and in need of care" found in many of its sections. Only three of these
sections, however, deal with the involuntary civil commitment of a person
found to be mentally disabled. 16 The first is Section 404 which is entitled
"Commitment on Application . . .,1*7 and is commonly referred to as an
ex parte commitment "because the process is initiated by persons other
than the prospective patient, with no notice to him and no opportunity
for him to protest."18 The statute simply requires that any of the desig-
nated groups or individuals may make written application "in the interest
of any person who appears to be mentally disabled and in need of care."'19
This application must also be accompanied by certificates of two examining
physicians stating that "in their opinion, such person is mentally disabled
and in need of care."'20 These two requirements suffice to authorize the
director of the institution to detain this individual until he may be dis-
charged in accordance with the provisions of the Act.21
Although serious doubts have arisen concerning the lack of due
process safeguards inherent in this procedure, a number of courts and
scholars have found it to be justified.22 The usual argument is that formal
due process requirements would be harmful to the mentally ill person
sought to be committed2 3 and that the procedural standards need not be
16. See note 10 supra.
17. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4404 (1969).
18. Comment, Hospitalization of the Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: The
Mental Health - Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 71 DIcK. L. REv. 300, 317 (1967).
19. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4404(a) (1969) (emphasis added). Those persons
who may file an application include:
a relative, guardian, friend, individual standing in loco parentis to the person to
be committed, or by the executive officer or an authorized agent of a govern-
mental or recognized non-profit health or welfare organization or agency or any
responsible person.
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4404(b) (1969).
21. Id. 4404(c). The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 lists
three sections dealing with release. The first is Section 4418 which provides for
release when "care or treatment is no longer necessary." This determination is made
in accordance with Section 4404(d), which requires at least an annual review of the
patients' status by the staff of the detaining facility. For discususion of "staff" con-
ferences, see Comment, Commitment to Fairview: Incompetency to Stand Trial in
Pennsylvania, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1164, 1188 nn.144-47 (1969).
The second release provision is Section 4420 which authorizes review of any
commitment under this Act by the Director of the Department of Public Welfare and
further provides that the Director may release any person who was civilly committed
and is no longer in need of care.
The third release provision is Section 4426 which allows any person com-
mitted or detained under the Act or anyone acting in his behalf to petition for a
writ of Habeas Corpus. The petition may be based upon (1) the insufficiency or
illegality of the proceeding leading to commitment or (2) although the proceedings
were proper, continued detention is no longer warranted. An extensive discussion of
release procedures under this Act may be found in Comment, supra note 18, at 333-43.
See also Morris, Habeas Corpus and the Confinement of the Mentally Disordered in
New York: The Right to the Writ, 6 HARV. J. LEGIs. 27 (1968).
22. E.g., Ryman's Case, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 11 A.2d 677 (1940) (where the
court stated that the alleged insane person need not receive notice of hearing if it
would further endanger his mental health) ; but see State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax,
364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954) (where the court found that due process was
violated if notice was not given prior to admission).
23. See Kittrie, supra note 2, at 46.
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as stringent for civil commitment as for criminal prosecutions since the
former requires incarceration only as an incident of treatment. Many other
scholars have found this reasoning unconvincing,24 but there nevertheless
seems to be a general trend among the states "toward more relaxed and
less technical quasi-judicial and administrative procedures. ' 25 Pennsylvania
has always been dependent on a type of quasi-judicial procedure which, in
the past, took the form of ex parte commitments that generally accounted
for more than two-thirds of all voluntary and involuntary commitments. 2
There is a case currently pending in the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, however, which may drastically restrict the use
of that section.2 7 Dixon v. Attorney General is a class action brought by
certain inmates of Fairview Hospital to test the constitutionality of Section
404 as applied to that class.28  Should the plaintiffs be successful, the
validity of that section as applied to all other persons will come under
close judicial scrutiny. The effect of such a holding would also tend to
increase the number of commitments under Section 406 of the new statute.
The second most widely used method for involuntary incarceration
in Pennsylvania is that employed under Section 406 which is entitled
"Civil Court Commitment."2 9 Under this provision the same broad cate-
gory of individuals or institutions that initiate the ex parte commitment
of Section 40430 initiate this commitment procedure by petitioning the
Court that the named person "is believed to be mentally disabled, and in
need of care or treatment by reason of such mental disability."' Once
this is accomplished the court will: (1) issue a warrant requiring the
person to be brought before the court; (2) fix a date for a hearing which
will be as soon as the warrant is executed; and (3) notify interested
parties.3 2 After the hearing, the court may order either an immediate
examination by two physicians or commitment for a period up to ten
days for the purpose of examination."3 In either situation, a finding that
the person is "in need of care" authorizes the court to order hospitaliza-
tion, partial hospitalization or outpatient treatment for the designated
individual. 34 The desirability of providing the court with options to full-
time hospitalization is unquestionably a significant improvement over the
24. E.g., Harris, Mental Illness, Due Process and Lawyers, 55 A.B.A.J. 65
(1969); Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Procedures, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 383 (1962) ; Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty and the Law, 13
KAN. L. REV. 59 (1964) ; Comment, Due Process for All - Constitutional Standards
for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CHi. L. REV. 633 (1967);
Comment, Liberty and Required Mental Health Treatment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1067
(1966).
25. See Comment, supra note 13, at 690.
26. See Comment, supra note 18, at 321 n.118.
27. Dixon v. Attorney General, Civil No. 69293 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
28. Id.
29. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4406 (supp. 1969).
30. See note 19 supra.
31. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4406(a) (supp. 1969).
32. Id. § 4406(a) (3).
33. Id. § 4406(a) (4).
34. Id. § 4406(b).
[VOL. 15
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Mental Health Act of 1951,5 however, the omission of the requirement
that a person be found mentally disabled is a notable shortcoming. Under
Section 404 there must be a finding of both mental disability and "need
of care" whereas Section 406 requires only the latter.86 Since the court
is theoretically choosing hospitalization for the person sought to be com-
mitted because he is unable to make that choice, it is submitted that a
finding that he cannot in fact make this rational choice should be a minimal
prerequisite for commitment.3 7
Although the due process safeguards are more stringent under Section
406 than under Section 404, the former still lacks certain basic safeguards.
First, the hearing under this section is given at the wrong point in the
procedure. Instead of holding a hearing after the prospective patient has
been examined, it is held prior to any inquiry into his mental condition. 8
Second, the person sought to be committed has no right to have an
examination by the physician of his choice. This denies him a potentially
valuable witness for his defense. 89 Third, the statute does not specify a
right to counsel nor have Pennsylvania courts recognized such a right
because "an insanity hearing is not a criminal or an adversary proceeding
to determine appellant's guilt or innocence, but is a collateral proceeding...
35. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 1203(c) (1954), provided only for committing the
person to an institution without mention of intermediate alternatives.
36. The Mental Health Act of 1951 also required a finding "that the person in
question is mentally ill and ... is a proper subject for care." Id. § 1203(c).37. A great deal has been written on the subject of what standards will suffice to:
define the circumstances under which public authority - whether exercised
through medical or judicial agencies or some combination of them - mayjustifiably intervene, notwithstanding the patient's disinclination.
R. ROCK, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 8 (1968). Accord-
ing to a recent compilation and analysis of the mental health statutes in every state,
the predominant standards for commitment are a finding of (1) mental illness, (2)
need of care, or (3) dangerousness. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961). The difficulty in
using these concepts is that they are relative and not easily translated into legal
standards. One author expresses the dilemma in this manner:
Mental illness in short is . . .a conclusionary term .... This is not to deny
that certain individual psychic states exist which are not in the range of the
experimental spectrum of the majority. These "medical" states may be subject
to a certain amount of classification for treatment purposes by appropriate
therapists. Even by the use of labels, however, nosological categories are arbi-
trary, overlapping and descriptive.
Kaplan, supra note 14, at 29. The problem becomes, therefore, one of determining
what degree of mental illness, need of care or dangerousness is necessary before anindividual may be involuntarily committed. Unfortunately, no state statute speaks of
degree and the determination is left solely to the discretion of the court, psychiatrist
or both in accordance with the state statute in question. Some commentators gobeyond these arguments and state that the construct of mental illness is mythical.
E.g., Szasz, Hospital Refusal to Release Mental Patient, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 220(1960). But see Slovenko, supra note 24, at 77, where the author states:
Critics say that psychiatry is depriving people of their liberty and dignity.
But what is psychiatry depriving them of? Their "right" to waste life, to commit
suicide, to kill others? It is appealing to say, "let everyone do as he pleases,"but that attitude wrongfully absolves us from our social responsibilities.
38. It appears that two hearings would be ideal; one prior to the examination
to determine whether this examination is necessary and another after a finding of
mental disability to allow the prospective patient an opportunity to question the
medical findings and, if necessary, the type of treatment he is to receive.39. The availability of the prospective patient's own expert witness is an absolute
necessity for a fair hearing.
COMMENTS
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to inform the conscience of the Court .... ,,40 Furthermore, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has stated that counsel is not necessary because the
insanity proceeding is "for [the prospective patient's] benefit or for the
benefit of the public or both."'41 These arguments seem to beg the ques-
tion however, since the protesting person does not admit to his mental
disability nor does he feel that compulsory treatment will be beneficial (or
necessary) yet these are the central issues which are being adjudicated.
Section 405, which is entitled "Commitment for Emergency Deten-
tion" is the third and final method authorizing involuntary civil commit-
ments in Pennsylvania. 42 The purpose of this procedure is to enable a
specified class of persons to take into custody individuals who are believed
to be: (1) mentally ill; (2) pose a danger to themselves or others; and (3)
are in need of immediate care. Section 405 not only fulfills this stated
objective but also protects the civil rights of the individual while so doing.
It provides that the specified class of persons may take into custody a
person believed to be mentally ill but only if a written application has
been approved by the director of the institution or his delegate and:
[t]he acts or threats which give cause to believe the person to be
mentally disabled and in need of immediate care are overt, demonstrate
a clear and present danger to self or others and are set forth in
the application.
48
Immediately after being taken into custody, the person must be taken
to a physician or designated facility for examination. If the person is
found to be in immediate need of care at a particular facility, he will be
transported to such facility where he will be examined again to determine
if his detention is necessary in accordance with the statute.44 If the latter
is answered affirmatively, he may be detained for a maximum of ten days
unless application is made under other provisions of the Act or the patient
volunteers for admission.45 Should the physicians find, however, that the
person in custody is not in need of immediate care - assuming he has not
committed a criminal act - he is to be returned to the place where he was
taken into custody and released.46 The fact that the due process safe-
guards offered by this procedure are eminently more satisfactory than
those of Sections 404 and 406 may be due in part to the additional
requirement of "danger to self or others" as a prerequisite to commitment.
40. Commonwealth v. Bechtel, 384 Pa. 184, 190-91, 120 A.2d 295 (1956).
41. Id. at 190, 120 A.2d 295. But see Commonwealth ex rel. McGurrin v. Shovlin,
435 Pa. 474, 257 A.2d 902 (1969), where the court ruled, under its supervisory power,
that legal counsel should be present at a hearing before a court-appointed commission
when the prospective patient has been convicted or charged with a crime and his
sanity is at issue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has not extended this
ruling to civil commitments. See also Comment, The Right to Counsel at Civil
Competency Proceedings, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1967).
42. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4405 (supp. 1969).
43. Id. § 4405(a) (1)-(2) (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 4405(b).
45. Id. § 4405(f).
46. Id. § 4405(d).
[VOL. 15
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The phrase "danger to self or others" is an expression of dangerousness
which is a derivative of the state's police power rather than the doctrine
of parens patriae.47 The police power differs from the latter in that it is
"based on a theory of preventive detention - that some persons, though
innocent of any criminal act, are considered so dangerous that they must
be restrained to protect society or themselves. ' 48 There is little or no
emphasis upon treatment under this theory and without the assumption
of benevolent intent, commitment tends to be viewed in a more realistic
light as just another form of incarceration which necessitates greater
concern over definitional standards and procedural safeguards. 49
Some states have chosen to utilize their police power as the sole
justification for involuntary civil commitment whereas most states rely on
various combinations of the police power and parens patriae.50 Of the
three sections dealing with involuntary civil commitments in Pennsylvania,
only Section 405 specifically mentions dangerousness as a prerequisite. 51
Since Section 405 commitments are for a maximum of ten days, however,
it is logical to conclude that parens patriae accounts for virtually all of
Pennsylvania's involuntary civil commitments. As noted earlier, the Penn-
sylvania statute embodies the doctrine of parens patriae by use of the
disjunctive phrase "need of care or treatment." This phrase serves the
practical purpose of recognizing that some individuals may require care
even though they do not need treatment. The term care is not defined
anywhere in the statute, but it would seem that it refers to a person who
is either unwilling or unable to provide for his bodily needs, thereby
endangering his life or health. Included in this category would be persons
who are aged and/or senile and persons for whom there is no known cure
but who still require care. It is also conceivable that certain of those
persons who are considered dangerous may fall under this general classi-
ficatory scheme. There are, however, some dangerous individuals who
are neither in need of care nor treatment but who are nevertheless being
preventively detained under parens patriae because the Pennsylvania statute
does not have a police power section appropriate for such cases.
47. See generally Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some
Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity,
70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960) ; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories
and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288 (1966).
48. See Comment, supra note 13, at 683-84.
49. Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
50. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 37, at 7-8.
51. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4405 (supp. 1969). Although Sections 404 and 406
make no reference to the police power, the phrase "in need of care or treatment" is
sufficiently broad to include individuals who are primarily dangerous and yet would
not benefit from treatment even if it were available. Such an approach may be
regarded as a practical necessity but it hardly justifies committing an individual on
the grounds that he is "in need of care or treatment" when, in fact, neither care nor
treatment is necessary in many instances. Sections 404 and 406 should be amended
to include "dangerousness" as a ground for commitment and thereby remedy this
inconsistency between theory and practice.
COMMENTS
7
Bonneau: Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment in Pennsy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
B. Pennsylvania Practice
The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 states that
the Department of Public Welfare has the power and the duty to "assure
within the state the availability and equitable provision of adequate mental
health ... services for all persons who need them .... -52 As seen earlier,
the 1966 Act also provides that the state may commit anyone against his
will who is mentally ill if he is "in need of care or treatment.15 3 Reading
these provisions together, it seems conclusive that the state is responsible
for providing adequate treatment to all persons committed under the pro-
visions of this Act and who can benefit from it since need of treatment is
the sole justification for detention. If the state does have such a duty,
the question arises as to whether it is being performed. The necessary
components of that question include: (1) availability of treatment; (2)
adequacy of treatment; and (3) objective standards by which to measure
Pennsylvania's performance against other states.
The State of Pennsylvania, through the auspices of the Office of
Mental Health, administers eighteen hospitals for the mentally ill, as well
as a number of out-patient and halfway house facilities.54 During the fiscal
year 1967-68, these facilities served nearly 62,000 persons and of these,
more than 51,000 were listed as patients in the eighteen state hospitals. 55
During this same period of time, discharges from these institutions were
approximately equal to admissions so that no significant increase or de-
crease was registered.56 Based on these figures, a recent study estimates
that the average staff physician in Pennsylvania state-operated hospitals
was assigned 170 patients at any given time.57 This simple division of total
number of staff physicians into total number of patients, however, does
not accurately depict the situation. Actually:
[The] number of doctors includes those in the clinics and in intensive
care sections whose patient load does not exceed 50 or 60 and fre-
quently does not exceed 20 to 30.
In effect the result is that there are relatively few doctors to
take care of the psychiatric needs of the hundreds and sometimes
thousands of patients in the back wards who constitute the over-
whelming number of patients. 58
52. Id. § 4405(f).
53. See Part I A infra.
54. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, PUBLIC WELFARE REPORT
73 (1968).
55. Id. at 73, 76.
56. Id. at 74.
57. See Reibman, Rights of Mental Patients To Treatment and Remunerationfor Institutional Work, 39 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 538 (1968).
58. Id. at 538. The author also states that as few as 20 to 30 patients represents
a heavy caseload if the doctor is actually providing psychiatric treatment.
The term back ward is generally used to denote "a ward where mentally ill
patients whose prognosis is poor are housed and where patients typically receive only
custodial care." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 160 (1965).
[VOL. 15
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These statistics disclose the availability of adequate mental health services
in Pennsylvania state institutions but reveal very little about the adequacy
of treatment since the only presently available standards with which to
measure adequacy of treatment are themselves misleading. These stand-
ards, which were promulgated by the American Psychiatric Association,
merely set out manpower requirements and express no preference con-
cerning different therapies or quality of treatment.5 9 Although they are
far from comprehensive, the APA standards do provide, however, one
measure of adequacy of treatment - availability.
When viewed against these minimum standards, the manpower re-
sources available in Pennsylvania's public mental hospitals are grossly
inadequate and in the patient-load category specifically, these institutions
are 25% below minimum standards.60 This figure, when combined with
the previously mentioned discrepancy in averaging techniques, is rather
conclusive that the majority of patients in Pennsylvania mental hospitals
rarely see a physician and many back ward patients almost never see a
physician.6 1 This finding may not suffice to rule the treatment received
in these institutions as inadequate, but it does indicate that it is not readily
available to all who need it (unless custody is considered therapeutic),
nor is it commensurate with national standards.
62
The Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 places great
stress on "need of care" and other therapeutic aspects of involuntary
commitment but in practice the custodial rather than the therapeutic
elements are far more apparent. There are two avenues of approach open
to remedy this inconsistency. The first is to abandon any pretext of
treatment by amending the statute along the lines of preventive detention
for dangerousness rather than the present parens patriae rationale. By
59. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR HOSPITALS AND CLINICS(1958).
60. The American Psychiatric Association, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania
Mental Health Survey Committee, calculate yearly personnel quotas based on APA
Standards for Pennsylvania's Mental Health Hospitals. The quotas are expressed as











Therapeutic Recreators .... 35
DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE, COM. OF PA., REPORT ON PERSONNEL OF STATE MENTAL
INSTITUTIONS: 1966 (Oct. 4, 1966).
61. Because the hospitals are so terribly understaffed not only in terms of doctors,
but nurses, psychiatric social workers, psychologists, therapists and aids, many
patients become virtually permanent residents of the institution. . . . what it all
boils down to is that the choice is made not to treat these large numbers of
chronically ill patients in the mental institutions of this state.
Reibman, supra note 57, at 539.
62. Id. at 538, where the author states that in 1966 Pennsylvania ranked forty-
fifth among all states in terms of the ratio of doctors to patients.
COMMENTS
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defining "dangerousness" with sufficient breadth, the police power of the
state could then replace parens patriae power thus making the statutory
theory consistent with practice. This, however, would be a regression
from the declared desire to rehabilitate to the merely protective considera-
tion of custodial detention.6 Notwithstanding humanitarian objections,
this approach also suffers from significant practical shortcomings. Preven-
tive detention of dangerous persons for an indeterminate period of time is
ultimately based upon a prediction of future behavior (or misbehavior).
The problem then becomes one of predicting how "likely" or "probable"
it is that the person will endanger himself or others. 64 If it seems "likely"
that he will injure himself or others, certain pivotal considerations arise.
Of what significance, for example, is the extent of probable injury; or
that the predicted injury is to property rather than person? These and
other similar questions suggest the type of information necessary before
a person may be involuntarily committed for "dangerousness." Such
information, however, can be accumulated only by the use of presently
available clinical tools and methods for predicting future behavior, and
their reliability is doubtful. Another consideration related to the question
of commitment for dangerousness was raised by the District of Columbia
circuit in Rouse v. Cameron65 when the court suggested that confinement
for dangerousness would be constitutionally permissible only if the in-
dividual is afforded procedural safeguards similar to those in the criminal
process. Although the Rouse approach has not yet received general
acceptance, in the absence of the benevolent intent found in parens patriae,
the procedural safeguards under the police power rationale are neces-
sarily more stringent in most jurisdictions.6
A second approach to solving the conflict between the statutory
justification for deprivation of liberty and the conditions actually prevalent
in mental institutions is the recognition of a right to treatment.
III. .THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
Psychiatrists and lawyers have recently become cognizant of the fact
that overcrowding and understaffing in our public mental institutions re-
sults in inadequate treatment for the average patient. One proposal sug-
gested that a remedy to this problem was recognition of a so-called "right
to treatment. '6 7 As originally envisioned, the right would apply where
a person is involuntarily institutionalized in a mental institution be-
cause he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institutionalization for
63. See Deutch, supra note 3.
64. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties encountered in attempting to
predict future behavior, see Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for
Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75 (1968). See also Tao, Some Problems
Relating to Compulsory Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 44 J. URB. L. 459, 478-82(1967).
65. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).66. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 37, at 44-51. For a general
discussion of statutory basis, see Livermore, supra note 64.
67. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
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care and treatment, he needs, and is entitled to adequate medical
treatment; that being mentally ill is not a crime; that an institution
that involuntarily institutionalizes the mentally ill without giving them
adequate medical treatment for their mental illness is a mental prison
and not a mental hospital; and that substantive due process of law
does not allow a mentally ill person who has committed no crime to
be deprived of his liberty by indefinitely institutionalizing him in
a mental prison. 68
The right to treatment, therefore, was considered to be constitutionally
enforceable through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
but, the author was less emphatic in regard to the standards with which
to measure adequacy of treatment.6 9 He did state, however, that if a
court found that a patient was not receiving "proper medical treatment,"
the patient should be released in spite of the existence or severity of his
mental illness. 70 The broad implications of this novel proposal aroused
considerable controversy among legal and medical scholars when it was
initially suggested and it has not yet been resolved. 71
The passage by Congress of the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Act 72 for the District of Columbia in 1964 was the first major break-
through for statutory implementation of the right to treatment. The Act
states specifically that: "A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a
mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, be entitled to medical and
psychiatric care and treatment."7 Relying on this language, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has ruled in a recent
group of cases that civilly committed patients,74 persons confined after an
insanity acquittal, 75 and persons committed as sexual psychopaths 76 all
have a judicially enforceable right to treatment. Although in these cases
the right was found to be statutorily based, Chief Judge Bazelon went
beyond the statute to express the view that there existed possible consti-
tutional infirmities in commitments that are absent treatment.7 7 He sug-
gested that (1) civil confinement for indefinite duration without treatment
may be sufficiently inhumane as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
68. Id. at 503 (emphasis added).69. Dr. Birnbaum felt that the courts should establish standards for adequacy of
treatment using APA standards as a guide. Id. at 504. More recently, however, Dr.Birnbaum has been a strong advocate of a legislative approach and assisted in drafting
Pennsylvania's proposed "Right to Treatment Act of 1968" which is discussed at
length in Part III of this comment. See Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57
GEo. L.J. 752 (1969).
70. Birnbaum, supra note 67, at 503.
71. See, e.g., Bassiouni, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Cure and Treatment:
Medical Due Process, 15 DE PAUL L. REv. 291 (1966) ; Szasz, Civil Liberties and
the Mentally 11, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 399 (1960) ; Note, The Nascent Right to
Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134 (1967). See generally Symposium, The Right to
Treatment, 57 GEO. L.J. 673 (1969).
72. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-501 to -591 (1967).
73. Id. § 21-562 (1967).
74. Dobson v. Cameron, 383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
75. Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
76. Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
77. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C, Cir. 1966).
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and that (2) confinement for dangerousness without treatment will be
violative of due process unless rigorous procedural safeguards similar to
those in criminal process are utilized.7 8 The extent of judicial recognition
of a right to treatment based on constitutional grounds is found in two
cases - Nason v. Super. of Bridgewater State Hospital" and Sas v.
Maryland.80 In Nason the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that "[i]f
such treatment is not available on a reasonable, nondiscriminatory basis,
there is substantial risk that the constitutional requirements of equal pro-
tection of the laws will not be satisfied. . . ."81 The court in Sas on the
other hand, stated that although Maryland's commitment statute was con-
stitutional on its face, it might be unconstitutional as applied if treatment
was not made available as required by statute. The cases of these three
jurisdictions comprise the extent of judicial recognition of a statutory
and/or constitutional right to treatment and will be the focal point of the
ongoing discussion concerning the desirability of adopting such a right.8 2
The bulk of the criticism heaped upon the right to treatment as
promulgated by the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court falls primarily within two broad categories. The
first is that the courts do not possess the expertise to determine the ade-
quacy of treatment, and that the definitions of treatment and it's adequacy
are the responsibility of physicians. However, one response to this criticism
might be, as stated by one authority, that:
[W]henever deprivation of liberty is in issue, it is often not fully
realized that the law, and not psychiatry, is the ultimate decision-
maker. As long as this is not clear, role confusion will intrude on
any delegation of authority.8 3
The courts are not attempting to impinge upon the legitimate role of
psychiatrists but rather are requiring that the medical profession establish
standards of treatment which will enable the courts to intelligently deter-
mine if continued detention is necessary in a given case. Without such
guidelines, psychiatrists, and not the courts, are the final authority in
determining the personal liberties of mental patients.8 4 This abdication of
the traditional judicial function can hardly be justified in light of this
country's historical concern over the need to guard the civil liberties of
its citizens.
The second general criticism is that the courts are not the proper arm
of the government to implement such a far-reaching concept as the right
78. Id.
79. 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968).
80. Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964) (where the court examined
substance of treatment to determine if confinement met constitutional and statutory
requisites).
81. Nason v. Super. of Bridgwater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 612, 233 N.E.2d
908, 913 (1968).
82. See note 71 supra.
83. Katz, The Right to Treatment - An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI.
L. REv. 755, 765 (1969).
84. Id. at 764-67.
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to treatment. Since the legislature is better equipped to create specific
procedures and establish the necessary institutions for full adoption of the
right to treatment (if they so desired), it is argued that the courts should
recognize the boundaries of their field of competence and thereby cease
legislating rights for which there are no remedies.8 5 Chief Judge Bazelon,
however, responds to this argument by pointing out that although he is
fully aware of the legislature's superior resources and expertise in such an
area, in the absence of any legislative intent to utilize these admittedly
preferable tools, the court must function to protect the rights of persons
committed to our public mental institutions."0 Furthermore, he replies
that "[t] he duty of the reviewing court is . . . to study the record . . . to
insure that the administrators have performed their task with care and
reached a reasonable result."87 Although related, this refutation does not
fully answer the second type of criticism which is directed at the inability
of the courts to anticipate and rectify the effects of a right to treatment.
One of the most troublesome aspects of this right is that under the guide-
lines set out in Rouse, the already understaffed hospitals will be forced
to spend extensive periods of time preparing for and participating in
hearings to determine the adequacy of therapy.8 8 The reason for this is
that Rouse requires that in habeas corpus proceedings the institutions must
show not only adequacy of personal and physical facilities but also that
the therapy being given is adequate for "this petitioner." 89 The burden is
an extremely heavy one and necessarily relies upon subjective judgments
by the court since standards to measure availability and quality of treat-
ment are vague and generally unsatisfactory.90 It has also been suggested
that a habeas corpus hearing at which the adequacy of treatment is being
discussed could very well have an anti-therapeutic effect upon the par-
ticipating patient.91
These problems are associated with the failure of the courts to make
appropriate distinctions regarding what "duties" and "rights" are implied
by the term "right to treatment." If a patient has a right to receive treat-
85. E.g., Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752, 760 (1969)
Note, supra note 49, at 107; Recent Cases, 80 HARV. L. REv. 898 (1967).
86. See Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cai. L. REv. 742
(1969).
87. Id. at 744.
88. See Adelstein, Rights of Mental Patients to Treatment and Remuneration for
Institutional Work, 39 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 548, 549 (1968); Birnbaum, supra note 85,
at 760.
89. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Habeas corpus
proceedings are commonly used in most states to review findings of insanity. See 39
C.J.S. Insane Persons § 48 (1955).
90. The criteria expressed by the Court include: (1) bona fide effort by the
hospital to provide treatment that will improve or cure the patient; (2) effort to
provide treatment adequate in light of present knowledge although it does not have to
be the best; (3) adequate number of psychiatric personnel; and (4) a periodic review
of the adequacy of the patient's treatment program. Id. at 456-58. With the sole
exception of the third criteria, these requirements are far too vague to provide the
courts any guidance in making their findings. See Katz, supra note 83, at 779.
91. See Birnbaum, supra note 85, at 761. The author expressed the view that
hearings not only delayed the patients receipt of psychiatric services, but that the
atmosphere created by adversary litigation could also have an anti-therapeutic effect.
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ment and the institution has a corresponding duty to dispense it, what
should be the response of an institution if a patient refuses treatment or
refuses a particular form of therapy or there is no known treatment to
cure a given patient's condition? A number of alternatives would seem
to be open to the institution including, but not limited to: (1) retention
of the patient until he is ready to accept treatment; (2) coercion of the
patient into accepting treatment or administering treatment against his
will; (3) releasing the patient; or (4) making some other form of cus-
todial disposition. 92 Such determinations necessarily involve a delicate
balancing between the patient's right to freedom and society's well-being.
In many instances it may also require a complete re-examination of the
state's statutory basis for involuntary commitments. Although, as Chief
Judge Bazelon suggested, the courts do have a role to play in this
area, the magnanimity of the problem presupposes the need for legisla-
tive intervention.
It has been suggested that the first task of law and psychiatry is to
limit the right to treatment.98 The reason for this is that there are a
number of patients who are committed to mental hospitals who are incur-
able or at least for whom there is no known method of effective treatment.
The actual rationale for committing such patients is either that they are
too dangerous to remain at large or that they are "in need of care" because
they cannot or will not supply their own bodily needs. There is serious
doubt that mental hospitals are the proper place for such persons but in
the absence of other appropriate facilities, these institutions must continue
to detain and care for such individuals. To extend a right to treatment
to such persons, however, is highly delusional since they cannot benefit
from it. There may well be some patients who are "dangerous" or are
simply in "need of care," but who might also benefit from treatment. In
such cases the right to treatment should apply. The logical limit of the
right to treatment, therefore, is that any patient who can benefit from
treatment, regardless of the reason for his commitment, has a right to re-
ceive adequate treatment and the state has a duty to make it available. The
need for such a clarification is undisputed but represents only a start at
attempting to nullify the negative aspects of this otherwise desirable concept.
By way of recapitulation it has been seen that Pennsylvania relies
upon the doctrine of parens patriae to justify virtually all of its involuntary
civil commitments.9 4 Since parens patriae deprives a mentally ill person
of his liberty because he is in "need of care or treatment," it would seem
to follow that the state has a duty to make that treatment available to
all who can benefit from it.95 Pennsylvania and most other states have
failed to fulfill this responsibility yet they continiue to hold these persons
in custody. 96 The courts of several jurisdictions have attempted to rectify
92. See Katz, supra note 83, at 756.
93. Id. at 775.
94. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
96. See Part I B infra.
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this situation by recognizing a judicially enforceable "right to treatment"
based on statutory and/or constitutional grounds. While recognizing the
obvious merits of such an approach, many scholars are critical of the
manner and source by which such a right would be implemented and
favor a legislative rather than judicial adoption. The courts, in the face
of legislative inaction, reiterate that they can not refuse to protect the
fundamental rights of the involuntarily committed mental patient.
97
At this juncture it seems desirable to examine the options which
confront the State of Pennsylvania concerning the right to treatment. It
would seem that Pennsylvania can act or be acted upon in either of three
ways. The first and most apparent form of action is inaction, or the
maintenance of the status quo. Such an approach would not only be in-
consistent with the paternalistic rationale used to justify the deprivation
of liberty of many Pennsylvania citizens, but would also be a gross derelic-
tion of the State's duty not to provide treatment for these people. The
inequity of maintaining the status quo is so obvious as to not warrant
further discussion. The second option is for Pennsylvania courts to recog-
nize and enforce a "right to treatment" based either on statutory or con-
stitutional grounds. The third type of action available is legislative and
would encompass a restructuring of the State's Mental Health Act to
include, among other things, a right to treatment. These two proposals
will be treated separately below.
A review of the statutory language in the Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966 reveals that phrases such as "need of care" and
"need of care or treatment" are used repeatedly but that "need of care and
treatment" is not utilized.98 The latter, which is a component of the
District of Columbia provision,99 would amount to a guarantee by the
State that a patient is entitled to active treatment. There is authority to
the effect that use of the disjunctive phrase "care or treatment" in the
1966 Act was intended by the legislators because it was felt that the
"Commonwealth would be exposing itself to innumerable lawsuits for
services that its facilities could not now provide."' 0 0 The disjunctive
phrase also recognizes, however, that some patients, although in need of
care, are not in need of treatment nor could they benefit from receiving
such treatment. Whether this expression of legislative intent would pre-
clude a court's finding of a statutory right to treatment is not clear but
it does diminish the likelihood of such an occurrence.
An argument might be made that the statutory language is clear on
its face and does charge the Department of Public Welfare with the duty
to provide adequate mental health services for all who need them. 101 The
97. See Part II infra.
98. PA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 4101-704 (supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
99. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1967) ; see note 73 supra.
100. Comment, supra note 18, at 346, citing to an interview with Dr. William P.
Camp, Commissioner of Mental Health for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in
Harrisburg, October 25, 1966.
101. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 4201 (supp. 1969).
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failure of the Act to define "adequate mental health services," "care" and
"treatment"' 10 2 would hardly justify a court's finding that mere custody
of a person in need of treatment may be statutorily equated to any or all
of these especially in light of the paternalistic tone of the entire Act.
Although it would be speculative indeed to assert that such an argu-
ment would meet favorable response in the courts, it does indicate that
recognition of a statutory right to treatment is not altogether improbable.
A far stronger case can be made for a right to treatment based upon
constitutional grounds. Mr. Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, writing for a unanimous Court in Commonwealth v. Williams,0 3
stated that the:
Relator in Rouse was not in a penal institution, he was in a mental
hospital whose only justification for confining him was his need for
medical treatment. Having been found guilty of no crime, he could
not be kept in custody for any reason other than treatment. It follows
inexorably therefore that the court in Rouse had no choice but to
find relator entitled to proper treatment. To hold otherwise would
be tantamount to permitting involuntary hospitalization for no reason
other than pure confinement, an obvious due process violation.10 4
This favorable commentary on the court's holding in Rouse would seem
to indicate that if Pennsylvania's highest court was presented with an
appropriate case, it would rule that involuntary civil commitment without
"proper treatment" is violative of "due process." Since Pennsylvania
justifies its involuntary civil commitments upon parens patriae - need
of care or treatment - and frequently treatment is not or cannot be
provided for those who need it, a case presenting a fact situation similar
to Rouse should not be long in appearing before this court. Although the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania may not yet be ready to find a constitu-
tional right to treatment, a ruling that confinement without treatment
violates "due process" would in practice have almost the same effect.
Whichever approach the court would choose, it will not avoid the necessary
difficulty of defining standards of "proper treatment" or the other problems
encountered in judicial enforcement of a right to treatment. But the
difficulty of enforcing a right to treatment would not suffice to justify a
supreme court decision to defer to the General Assembly's judgment when
the latter has not acted and the rights of mental patients are being violated.
102. Id. § 4102.
103. 432 Pa. 44, 246 A.2d 356 (1968). This case dealt with the commitment of
mental defectives with criminal tendencies in an institution which provided no treat-
ment. One of appellant's arguments was that it was unconstitutional to commit mental
defectives without treatment. The court found, however, that Dallas (the institution)
was penal and that there was no need for treatment because mental defectives were
excluded in the definition of "mental illness" in the Mental Health Act of 1951.
Id. at 60, 246 A.2d at 368. See also Comment, Post Conviction Problems and the
Defective Delinquent, 12 VILL. L. REV. 545 (1967). The term mental deficiency is
included in the definition of "mental disability" of the Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act of 1966. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4102 (supp. 1969).
104. Id. at 60, 246 A.2d at 365 (emphasis added).
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IV. RIGHT TO TREATMENT LAW OF 1968
A comprehensive legislative attempt to deal with the complex sub-
stantive and procedural problems of adequate treatment and care of mental
patients is Pennsylvania's proposed "Right to Treatment Law of 1968."105
Although this bill was left in committee in 1968 and still remains there
after being reintroduced during the General Assembly's 1969 session, its
unique status warrants an examination of its main provisions. 06
The purpose of this bill is to establish an administrative procedure
under which each mental patient would have a legal right to receive at
least a minimum standard of treatment. 10 7 The bill requires the creation
of a "Mental Treatment Standards Committee"' 08 which is entrusted with
promulgating these standards and compiling them into a "Manual of Mini-
mum Standards for Treatment of the Mentally Ill in State Mental Insti-
tutions."' 1 9 One of the bill's goals is to establish standards expressed in
objective terms, thus avoiding numerous subjective evaluations." 0 In
drafting its standards the committee is instructed to include minimum:
(1) personnel-patient ratios (at least equal to APA standards) ; (2) pro-
fessional personnel qualifications; and (3) number of consultations and
physical examinations.'' One provision, however, specifically states that
"[t]he Committee shall not include in its standards any requirements relat-
ing to selection and conduct ... of their treatment methods or procedures,
nor the judgment, skill or care used by these practitioners." 1 2 Essentially
this provision excludes quality of treatment as a component of adequate
treatment; this exclusion, although consistent with the desire for objective
standards, seriously weakens the effectiveness of the right to treatment."8
The bill also provides for the establishment of a "Patient Treatment
Review Board" whose duty would be to receive, hear and investigate
petitions filed on behalf of patients who allege that they are not receiving
105. S.B. 1274 & H.B. 2118, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1968 Sess.
106. S.B. 158, Pa. Gen. Assembly, 1969 Sess. [hereinafter cited as Pa. Bill]. The
1968 version of the Pa. Bill was reported out of the Joint Committee on Public Health
and Welfare and then referred to the Senate Appropriations Committee where it
remained for the duration of the 1968 session. The 1969 version is still in the Senate
Committee on Health and Welfare. Since the bills are quite similar, this paper will
deal exclusively with the 1969 version of the Pa. Bill.
107. Pa. Bill § 5 (a).
108. Id. § 3. This Section specifies that the Committee will be composed of seven
members and lists the qualifications which each must possess. Those to be included
are: a non-administrator psychiatrist, a licensed physician, a psychiatric social worker,
a clinical psychologist, an administrator psychiatrist, a registered nurse and the
Commissioner of Mental Health of the Department of Public Welfare who is to serve
in an advisory capacity.
109. Id. § 4.
110. Id. § 4(d).
111. Id. § 4(b).
112. Id. § 4(d).
113. See Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO.
L.J. 782, 806-17 (1969) ; see also notes 116-18 infra and accompanying text.
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minimum treatment in accordance with the Manual's standards.114 The
Board, which is composed of two psychiatrists, two medical practitioners
and one attorney, operates as an administrative agency in that it makes
findings of fact and dispositions in accordance with the provisions set
out in the Act. Furthermore the mental patient is permitted to seek
judicial review if he disagrees with the Board's findings or ruling." 5
This legislative proposal has generally received favorable response
from scholars in the field" 6 but certain weaknesses in its basic approach
have been noted. First, the exclusion of the quality of treatment as a
component of the minimum standards of treatment is a critical short-
coming. As one author states:
[t]his approach to adequate treatment indicates that the review board
would have no responsibility other than assuring that minimum staff
ratios and other criteria were met. Such a statistical summary would
tell the board nothing about the treatment being received by a patient.
It would be a waste of resources to have a body of expert mental
health professionals doing something that a trained accountant could
accomplish. 117
Since both the Standards Committee and the Review Board are staffed
almost exclusively with expert medical and mental health personnel, there
seems to be little doubt that they could promulgate and enforce minimum
standards which would be acceptable to the medical profession. 118 Under
114. Pa. Bill § 6. The Board is empowered to promulgate and issue procedural
regulations which will insure that petitioners receive notice, fair procedure and prompt
disposition of their petitions.
As envisioned by this bill the Board will serve as an administrative body to
make findings and initiate limited action which may not include release. It also
appears that this remedy would have to be exhausted prior to seeking judicial relief.
The procedure is initiated when a patient or his representative petition the Board
stating that he is not receiving minimum treatment in accordance with the Manual.
If the Board agrees with the petitioner, the superintendent involved must be given an
opportunity to concur in the finding. Should he concur, a probationary period of three
months will ensue during which time minimum treatment is to begin. Id. § 7.
Judicial relief is available when: (1) the Board initially found that treatment
was adequate and petitioner disagrees; (2) the Superintendent fails to concur in the
Board's affirmative finding; (3) treatment was not initiated before the end of the
three month period or fails to meet minimum standards; or (4) the Board fails to
notify petitioner of any finding within one month of filing. Judicial relief includes a
writ of mandamus, and order requiring the Commonwealth to permit and pay for
private psychiatric care, and the writ of habeas corpus. The latter is modified in that
the court does not have to release a patient, even if he is not receiving treatment,
when the patient: (1) is demonstrably dangerous to himself or others; (2) has been
convicted of a crime and his sentence has not expired; (3) has been acquitted of a
crime by reason of insanity; (4) has been charged with a crime and has not yet been
tried; or (5) he has been convicted of a crime and committed in lieu of a sentence.
In any of the above circumstances, however, the court may order transfer to an
institution where treatment will be available. Id. § 8.
115. Id.
116. E.g., Adelstein, supra note 88, at 548; Bazelon, Rights of Mental Patients to
Treatment and Remuneration for Institutional Work, 39 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 543;
Birnbaum, supra note 85, at 763-65.
117. Halpern, supra note 113, at 809.
118. There is no doubt that there exists considerable controversy among the
various schools of thought in psychiatry concerning what is adequate treatment; but
it would seem that sufficient accord could be had to promulgate minimum standards of
treatment. The former Superintendent of Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Washington, 18
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these circumstances, including quality of treatment in the standards
would create little conflict while serving as a desirable adjunct to the
present provisions.
A second major shortcoming of the proposed bill is that the initia-
tive for raising contentions that treatment is inadequate must come from
the patient."l 9 There have been some suggestions that the bill should
provide for periodic and automatic review of the treatment received by
the patient every six months or perhaps every year.120 Under this
approach every patient would be insured a minimum standard of treat-
ment regardless of the reason for which he might have failed to raise
the issue himself. Another suggestion is that the concept of indeter-
minate detention be abandoned and that time limits be placed upon the
length of detention because:
[They] will facilitate the establishment of a therapeutic atmosphere
which psychiatrists should welcome. No therapeutic community can
function optimally with persons who are indefinitely condemned to
treatment they do not want or from which they cannot benefit. 121
This approach attempts to redress the balance between patient and
physician in their psycho-therapeutic relationship. Since this relationship
is based upon cooperation, removing the threat (actual or implied) of
indefinite commitment for refusal to accept treatment would tend to make
the relationship more voluntary and thereby more beneficial.1 22 This time
limit proposal would also obviate the need for periodic review of treat-
ment since patients would be released after relatively short intervals. 128
The proposed right to treatment law has also raised some doubts
concerning its practicality because of the extremely high cost of fully
implementing its provisions. One authority estimated that raising per-
sonnel levels up to the staffing standard set by the APA alone would
require an additional $26 million a year.12 4 There is little doubt that the
bill's provisions would increase costs but if the right to treatment were
limited to those who can benefit from it, the increase in costs would not
D.C., where most of the right to treatment cases originated, has recently written an
excellent article related to this subject. See Cameron, Nonmedical Judgment of
Medical Matters, 57 GEO. L.J. 716 (1969).
119. Pa. Bill § 7(a). See also Bazelon, supra note 116, at 546.
120. See Bazelon, supra note 116, at 546; see also In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385,
297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968), where the court noted that a procedure which relied upon a
patient's affirmative action to initiate a statutory scheme was inadequate to protect
the patient's rights.
121. Katz, supra note 83, at 773 n.56. Implementing such a scheme would obviously
necessitate an adjustment of the time limit to reflect circumstances such as danger to
self or others.
122. Id. at 772-75.
123. The LANTERMAN-PETRIS SHORT AcT of California which became effective in
July of 1969 has completely abandoned the concept of indefinite involuntary commit-
ments. It establishes an elaborate procedure which determines standards for 72
hour evaluations and 14 day (with a maximum of 90 days) commitment for intensive
psychiatric treatment. The time limits vary according to the severity of the mental
disorder and degree of dangerousness to self or others. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 5000 et seq. (supp. 1970).
124. See Adelstein, supra note 88, at 548.
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be this dramatic. This approach reflects what is already being done in
practice - applying resources where they will be most beneficial - but,
it will also require that non-treatment be justified to an outside authority -
the Review Board.12 5
The utility of the "right to treatment" concept is not restricted to the
area of making therapeutic facilities available to the mentally ill individual;
it also provides an opportunity for reflection upon the entire philosophical
basis for involuntary civil commitments. "The law is concerned with
control of antisocial or prohibited conduct, and the prevention of such
conduct."'126 In fulfilling this function the law must determine what type
of conduct justifies the denial of liberty to one of its citizens and establish
procedures to insure that the individual's rights are not unduly constricted.
As seen earlier, Pennsylvania has determined that it will exercise its
sovereign power when an individual is mentally ill and "in need of care
or treatment." Since this state action is imposed upon the individual for
his own benefit it has been suggested that due process safeguards need
not be extensive. This lowering of due process safeguards, however, can
be justified only if the state does in fact provide adequate treatment to
those individuals who can benefit from it thus enabling them to regain
their freedom as soon as possible. In this respect, the right to treatment
would guarantee that the condition upon which commitment is based -
treatment - is being received. 2 7 In those cases in which the individual
cannot benefit from treatment, or is dangerous and cannot benefit from
treatment, his tenure in a state mental institution becomes one of preven-
tive detention. This detention must be checked by procedural safeguards
which will adequately protect this individual from indefinite imprisonment.
Pennsylvania does not statutorily recognize those who are dangerous and
incurahle and assumes that all mentally ill patients can and will benefit
from either care or treatment. This assumption is unfounded and im-
plicitly denies those persons who are dangerous and/or cannot respond
125. If and when the right to treatment is limited, great care should be taken
to insure that those who cannot benefit from or will not accept treatment are fully
protected. A periodic review of such persons should be required to determine if any
change in condition or circumstances has occurred. This procedure should be instituted
in addition to the availability of review by the Review Board and the courts.
126. J. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 156 (1968).
127. One authority has suggested that: [those] who feel that the mentally ill have
a right to treatment possibly represent less an attempt to get recognition for a
new legal principle than a desire to focus the attention of the public and the legis-
latures on the lack of personnel and the inadequacy of the therapeutic approach in
most state hospitals.
J. ROBITSCHER, PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT - PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 146 (1966).
Although there can be no doubt that the above represents one of the key motivations
of those who espouse the "right to treatment" concept, it would seem that disenchant-
ment with the entire scheme of commitment laws is also a strong motivational force.
Perhaps the strongest expression of this position is that:
Mental hospitals and prisons are the waste depositories of our cybernetic
society. We must empty the excrement back into society for a renewed fertiliza-
tion, not because those put back will regenerate ...but to force the society to
see ... its product and to understand what it is constantly producing.
Kaplan, supra note 14, at 33.
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to care or treatment the due process safeguards given to criminals who
are receiving a similar type of incarceration.
The recognition of a "right to treatment," will not remedy all of the
difficulties in the mental health field. It is, however, a step toward assur-
ing that more resources and better treatment will be afforded to mental
patients who can benefit from such treatment. A legislative measure of
the type proposed in Pennsylvania (with certain modifications) would
provide an excellent model for all states and could be of substantial assist-
ance to the courts. It is undisputed that this kind of legislative proposal
is far superior to any action that the courts might implement, but if the
legislature fails to act, it is the court's duty to insure that mentally ill
persons are not denied constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to delineate some of the major short-
comings found in those sections of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act of 1966 dealing with involuntary civil commit-
ments. In so doing, special emphasis was paid to the need to recognize
a limited right to treatment for all mental patients who could benefit from
such a right. The proposed Pennsylvania statute which would recognize
and enforce a right to treatment provides an excellent opportunity for a
sound and progressive mental health program in that state. The passage
of this legislation, as modified herein, should be a top priority on the
General Assembly's agenda.
It is also submitted that the 1966 Act be amended to include a section
dealing specifically with the preventive detention of individuals who are
dangerous and for whom there is no known cure or treatment available.
The doctrine of parens patriae presently utilized to commit these persons
is inappropriate and inconsistent with the fact that many of them are
neither in need of care nor treatment. This proposed section should also
incorporate stringent due process safeguards commensurate with the type
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